But now, if from the simple
fact that I can draw from my
thought the
idea of anything it follows that all that I recognise
clearly and
distinctly to pertain to this thing pertains to it in
reality,
can I not draw from this an
argument and a
demonstration of
the existence of God? It is certain that I do not find in me the less the
idea of him, that is, of a being
supremely perfect, than that of any
figure or of any
number whatever; and I do not know less clearly and
distinctly that an
actual and
eternal existence belongs to his
nature
than I know that all that I can
demonstrate of any figure or of any number
belongs truly to the
nature of that figure or that number: and accordingly,
although all that I have concluded in the preceding
meditations may not
turn out to be true, the
existence of God
ought to pass in my mind as being at least as
certain as I have up to
this time regarded the truths of
mathematics to be, which have to do
only with numbers and figures: although, indeed, that might not seem at
first to be
perfectly evident, but might appear to have some appearance
of
sophistry. For being accustomed in all other things to make a
distinction between
existence and
essence, I easily persuade myself
that existence may perhaps be separated from
the essence of God, and thus God might be
conceived as not existent actually. But nevertheless, when I think more
attentively, I find that existence can no more be separated from the
essence of God than from the essence of a
rectilinear triangle can be
separated the equality of its three angles to two right angles, or,
indeed, if you please, from the idea of a mountain the idea of a valley;
so that there would be no less contradiction in conceiving of a God -
that is, of a being supremely
perfect, to whom existence was wanting, that
is to say, to whom there was wanting any perfection - than in conceiving
of a mountain which had no valley.
But although, in reality, I might not be able to
conceive of a God without
existence, no more than of a mountain without a valley,
nevertheless, as from the simple fact that I conceive a mountain with a
valley, it does not follow that there exists any mountain in the world, so
likewise, although I conceive God as existent, it does not follow, it
seems, from that, that God exists, for my thought does not impose any
necessity on things; and as there is nothing to prevent my imagining a
winged horse, although there is none which has wings, so I might,
perhaps, be able to attribute existence to God, although there might not
be any God which existed. So far from this being so, it is just here under
the appearance of this objection that a sophism lies hid; for from the fact
that I cannot conceive a mountain without a valley, it does not follow
that there exists in the world any mountain or any valley, but solely
that the mountain and the valley, whether they exist or not, are inseparable
from one another; whereas from the fact alone that I cannot conceive
God except as existent, it follows that existence is inseparable
from him, and, consequently, that he exists in reality; not that my
thought can make it to be so, or that it can impose any necessity upon
things; but on the contrary the necessity which is in the thing itself,
that is to say, the necessity of the existence of God,
determines me to have this thought.
For it is not at my will to conceive of a God without
existence, that is to say, a being supremely perfect without a
supreme perfection, as it is
at my will to conceive a horse with wings or without wings.
And it must not also be said here that it is necessarily true that I
should affirm that God exists, after I have supposed him to possess
all kinds of perfection, since existence is one of these, but that my
first supposition is not necessary, no more than it is necessary to
affirm that all figures of four sides may be inscribed in the
circle, but that, supposing I had this thought, I should be
constrained to admit that the rhombus can be inscribed there, since it
is a figure of four sides, and thus I should be constrained to admit
something false. One ought not, I say, to allege this; for although
it may not be necessary that I should ever fall to thinking about God,
nevertheless, when it happens that I think upon a being first and supreme,
and draw, so to speak, the idea of him from the store-house of mind,
it is necessary that I attribute to him every sort of
perfection, although I may not go on to enumerate them all, and give
attention to each one in particular. And this necessity is sufficient to
bring it about (as soon as I recognise that I should next conclude that
existence is a perfection) that this first and supreme being exists: while,
just as it is not necessary that I ever imagine a triangle, but whenever
I choose to consider a rectilinear figure, composed solely of
three angles, it is absolutely necessary that I attribute to it all the
things which serve for the conclusion that there three angles are not
greater than two right angles, although, perhaps, I did
not then consider this in particular.
Source: The
Philosophy of
Descartes in
Extracts from His Writings. H. A. P. Torrey. New York, 1892. P. 161